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Whose Right to the City? Real Estate, Planning and Struggle 
 
 
Urban planning should matter to the left. Its professional practitioners shape daily life both 
present and future, facilitating, moderating and accommodating the many forces at work in 
towns and cities. Yet they are hardly ever seen. Samuel Stein’s Capital City: Gentrification 
and the Real Estate State is a radical view into the heart of the processes these planners 
oversee, and one engaging enough to keep you reading right past the first dreaded mention of 
zoning.  
 
Too often planning hides both the powers it has, and the many it does not, behind dry, 
technocratic language that reduces popular participation to a series of drawings on easels and 
choices around street trees. In so doing, it serves to obscure the inequalities of race and class 
that it has helped to inscribe into cities, making a manmade landscape of segregation and its 
resulting deadly injustices seem just a natural phenomenon. By dragging planning further out 
into the sunshine, Stein illuminates not just the devastating ways it can crack open our cities 
to the vampiric demands of capital, but also the limited yet still concrete possibilities for 
emancipatory change within its processes.  
 
The backdrop to Stein’s book is the monumental economic reordering that has occurred in 
cities across the Global North in recent decades: the rise of real estate as a financial 
commodity and its eclipse of the industries of the past. With land rather than labor now 
driving profit in many economies, all the rules are changing, even as an underlying violence 
persists. 
 
Stein begins by illustrating this through a tale of two tragic conflagrations. First was the 
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire, which killed 146 workers in just one example of the 
murderous nature of capital in the early twentieth century. He then moves to the inferno that 
in 2017 took at least seventy-two lives in London’s social housing tower of Grenfell. The 
Grenfell Action Group had warned the local authorities that it was a firetrap, but no action 
was taken to develop fire prevention measures.  “In 1911,” Stein writes “the arsonist was 
industrial capital…In 2017, it was real estate capital.”  
 
It is this ascendance of real estate as an economic force that has led to what Stein describes as 
the real estate state: “a political formation in which real estate capital has inordinate 
influence over the shape of our cities, parameters of our politics and the lives we lead.” This 
is not to argue that the power of real estate dealers and brokers is new, nor that it is all 
encompassing. But, Stein argues, it is increasingly outsized as there are no longer 
manufacturers and industrialists whose profits are supported by low property values and 
particularly low rents in worker housing. With this balance of competing capitalist interests 
gone, there is very little pushing rents and property values down.  
 
 Against this global real estate investment industry – valued at $217 trillion, or 60 percent of 
all the world’s assets – stand tenants fighting displacement and slum housing conditions. 
Some 75 percent of the real estate industry’s investments are in housing, and that 
concentrated power has resulted in rents skyrocketing beyond the capacity of poor and 
working households to keep up. The real estate industry’s drive for profit continues, 
moreover, to divide space by race and to intensify already existing racial inequalities. 
 
 
* 
 
Perhaps no city illustrates the rise of the real estate state as well as New York, and Stein 
devotes significant attention to that case. He shows how the centrality of real estate capital to 
the new urban economy helps to explain the similarities between such otherwise different 
mayors as Michael Bloomberg and Bill de Blasio. Both pushed for bigger and stronger police 
forces operating under the same broken windows theories wielded by William Bratton and 
Rudy Giuliani. And both ultimately supported the same planning paradigm of luxury housing 
development. The reason, Stein suggests, is structural: real estate capital ‘lurks’ behind every 
major fight in the city, and it is among the largest contributors to political campaigns. 
 
But if Stein draws most of its direct examples from New York, he also shows how the rise of 
the real estate state has been a national phenomenon. President Trump, in Stein’s mind, is not 
a politician working within the real estate state but the real estate state himself. There is a 
great chapter in here on the history behind the Trump family’s rise to fortune from a series of 
brothels and white-only developments to luxury apartments and casinos. As for the man 
himself, Trump’s trajectory can be measured in chapter titles alone. 
 
Donald Trump Part 1: The Neoliberal Playboy 
Donald Trump Part 2:  The Deregulated Swindler 
Donald Trump Part 3: President of the Real Estate State 
 
But the story of the real estate state is much bigger than Trump.  
 
Understanding how we got here requires reckoning with the underlying and ugly history of 
urban development in the U.S., both in terms of the power of the real estate state as well as 
the strength of the white fear and racism that brought Trump to power. White flight from 
inner cities is all too familiar a concept, but its deadly consequences in both cementing white 
identity as well as in the destruction of communities stripped of resources remain to be fully 
faced by our wider society.  
 
Beginning in 1970s, cities across the country increasingly faced issues of decaying 
infrastructure and high unemployment due to deindustrialization. This reduced tax bases 
while increasing support needs. As federal funding fell precipitously, the scramble to find 
alternative resources began. Cities primarily saw the solution to be increasing land values, 
which could prop up municipal revenues. Real estate appreciation thus became the highest 
good – it was what would attract outside business investment and invite higher-income 
(white) residents from their suburban strongholds. With limited resources of their own, 
municipal governments used tax breaks and complicated land assembly and tax-increment 
financing schemes to entice businesses, who themselves played cities off against each other 
for their own benefit.  
 Many urban officials may initially have pursued this strategy with the genuine goal of using 
the tax revenue generated by such redevelopment to improve the lives of existing residents. 
But the whole process was predicated on reconfiguring planning processes in ways that 
marginalized local residents and subordinated the public good to the demands of outside 
capital. As Stein puts it:  
 
What was public becomes private; what was common becomes enclosed; what was cheap becomes 
expensive; what was shared becomes traded. Through the real estate state, the city becomes gentrified. 
Through gentrification, the city becomes neoliberal.  
 
Gentrification and neoliberalism, that is, are part and parcel of a deeper economic shift driven 
in large part by real estate development. 
 
Yet if the real estate state is new, this battle between the public good and private gain returns 
us to a much older question in urban planning – just what it for? How much can planners of 
conscience achieve in this new conjunction of money and politics where increasing property 
values trumps every other consideration for land use?  
 
* 
 
These issues point to a basic tension between two competing tendencies that Stein describes: 
pragmatic utopianism on the one hand and a crude commitment to capital on the other. Both 
are present not just within planning departments but often within individual planners 
themselves. These tendencies, moreover, map on to two fundamental contradictions of 
planning the capitalist city, first outlined by Richard Foglesong in his 1986 book of that title. 
The first contradiction sits within real estate capital itself, as developers need certain planning 
regulations and interventions to maximize their profits, yet at the same time wish to minimize 
planning controls that could undercut this maximization. The second is that while planners as 
public servants need to preserve a certain amount of transparency and even democracy in 
planning processes, these cannot impinge too directly on the ability of developers to profit.  
 
Ultimately, it is the broader political context that determines which tendency is uppermost, 
and just how much of their vision planners can achieve. It is not surprising that the 1960s 
brought planning ever closer to a heavily resourced and radical (though often problematically 
implemented) vision of bottom up community-driven development, that the 1970s brought 
the withdrawal of resources from cities, and that the rise of neoliberalism brought new 
investment to support the private sector in cracking open cities to corporate extraction. The 
role of a progressive planner looks very different in each of those moments. The leverage that 
grassroots movements can wield in their specific fights also looks different. Understanding 
the political moment is key for those small but important wins.  
 
Still, the big wins require something else. 
 
And that is because capitalism, particularly our current variety, makes the best of planning 
impossible. Indeed, the choice is no longer between pragmatic utopianism and surrender to 
capital. It is even more stark: gentrification or complete disinvestment. There is no question 
in such a binary what politicians and planners must choose. Despite the ongoing struggle over 
the soul of planning, despite the insistence of a utopian community-driven strand using 
planning expertise to develop better spaces and better cities, the fundamental question Stein 
poses is just what can be accomplished where rising property value is the highest good and 
where this value is increasingly tied into global circuits of capital? 
 
By exploring the limits of what planning can accomplish under such circumstances, Capital 
City contributes to the larger strategic conversation we need. Such strategy has long been in 
the making among the many grassroots groups and communities within the US fighting 
against gentrification, displacement, and environmental racism and federating into larger 
groups like the Right to the City Alliance, the Movement for Black Lives and the 
Environmental Justice Movement. It is no surprise that such organizing is most developed 
within communities of color, as they have been the principal victims of planning from its 
very beginnings. Some of the strongest quotes in the book come from precisely these activists 
involved in the day-to-day struggles for their very right to continue living in their gentrifying 
neighborhoods. They have issued the radical demand that planning exist for people not for 
profit while at the same time fighting for smaller concrete reforms that build support for such 
a transformative vision. 
 
As Stein highlights, these local struggles must be directed towards steadily unmaking the real 
estate state. We must above all challenge the logic of land as a commodity. Housing cannot 
be understood as an investment but as a place for life, and not just our own lives but those of 
future generations. As Stein says, these solutions can only emerge out of a movement from 
below. They cannot and will not be top down initiatives.  
 
There are many ways to get there. Some involve repossessing land for a common good -- 
seizing that which sits empty and abandoned, apartments developed purely as investment 
vehicles, or slum housing milked for profit by absentee owners. Others involve further 
developing new structures for holding land in common while allowing dweller control, 
whether through municipal ownership, land trusts, or cooperative housing. As we move into 
an increasingly uncertain future this is perhaps the most vital work required from the left -- 
this transformation of long-held racialized and capitalist planning logics towards a rethinking 
of the relationship between government and development, people and place, life and land.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
